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By RHONDA V. MAGEE*
Prologue
As i SIT DOWN AT MY DESK to read a draft of the essay submitted to our
law review for this issue by Professor Dan Subotnik, the odd but well-understood
phrase "beside myself" comes to mind. A surge of negativity runs through me, so
intense it hurts from within. It is as if my body, all ninety-seven pounds of it,
has just been hit with a vein-deep infusion of deflating toxins, leaving a one-
dimensional shell in its place. The author whose work I am to review wrote a
book, of which he is apparently quite proud, titled Toxic Diversity. To think,
to speak, or to type this title makes my shoulders and jawline tense, my arms
tight and tingly. Because I have read as much of the book as I can take, and
attended a presentation by Professor Subotnik at our school a few months
back-a presentation sponsored by the University of San Francisco's ("USF")
student chapter of the Federalist Society-I know that the essay I am about to
read will very likely be an attack on critical race and gender theorists in the
legal academy. It will, therefore, be an attack on me-and it will feel like one.
I look away from the essay in an effort to ground myself more fully in the
present moment. It is a Sunday morning in the Spring semester of another year
of my life as a law professor. With regard to my own scholarly agenda, I am
plodding through research on the intersection of chattel slavery and immigra-
tion law, continuing a tradition I began in my own law review days of bring-
ing the legacies of slavery into the light of day and examining their
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consequences for contemporary law and policy.I The topics I choose to research
and write about reflect my values, my commitments, my sense of purpose as a
teacher in the world, and my experiences and those of the people whose lives
touched mine in the flatlands of North Carolina where I was born. Though this
morning's work is not a project I conceived of on my own, writing a response to
Professor Subotnik 's essay is in line with what I view as my purpose in life-to
teach with and through ever-widening circles of love and compassion, even in
the face of fear and oppression.
With a mixture of humility and pride I understand my place in a long
and distinguished line of scholars who have approached their work with a com-
mitment to education for social change. I am aware not only of the ways in
which scholarship has itself been the location of many a battle in the revolution-
ary war against white supremacy and patriarchy in the West, but also of the
critical importance of challenging conventional wisdom regarding the limits of
acceptable scholarship as a strategy of that war. As one who self-identifies as a
critical legal scholar with a focus on the legal and theoretical underpinnings of
race in America, I am among the minority at my school. But I do know I am in
good company in the legal academy in my commitment to infuse my scholarship
and teaching with the insight that experience powerfully shapes perception and
understanding. And I know this approach has had value to the many law
students I have been privileged to teach over the years.
I was reminded of this just last night. I gave the keynote address at the
Asian Pacific American Law Student Association end-of-the-year banquet, and
took in, as fully as I could, the extraordinary nature of this community of
students' journey toward acceptance in a discipline in which they have not
traditionally been welcome. Though we on the Appointments Committee are
doing our best, USF presently has no full-time Asian or Asian American law
professor.2 My own understanding of the legacies of exclusion leaves me feeling
a deep sense of obligation to stand up for this group of students when asked. It
is not uncommon that I feel such obligations as a Black woman3 law professor
1. See Rhonda V. Magee, The Master's Tools, from the Bottom Up: Responses to Reparations
Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies Discourse, 79 VA. L. REv. 863 (1993) [hereinafter
Magee, The Master's Tools].
2. "Full-time" here means tenured or tenure track. "Asian" means East or Southeast
Asian, and includes Pacific Islanders. We are fortunate to have among our tenure-track
faculty a woman of South Asian descent. In a recently concluded hiring round, the faculty
extended an offer to a professor of Asian American descent.
3. "Black woman" is a label I assume here as I do in my daily life in accordance with
convention. It is the label most often placed on me in the conventional society and culture
in which I spend my daily life, and as a statement of political commitment in light of that
reality. I am aware, however, that both race and gender are socially constructed figments of
the cultural imagination with references and correlates to certain very real world bodies
and physical characteristics. See, e.g.,JoE R. FFAGIN & CLAIRECE BOOHER FEAGIN, RACIAL AND
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on a predominantly white, male, and almost exclusively straight faculty.4 This
sort of work has been derided by some as cheerleading. Fortunately for me, for
the professors at USF and elsewhere who share my commitment to supporting all
of our students in ways that honor their particular needs, and for the students
whose experiences of law school have been positively impacted over the years as a
result, I have a different point of view.
I turn to the work at hand. I close my eyes and take a deep breath. I
recognize the sensations and feelings running through me. I have been here
before. I am experiencing the fight-or-flight response that, psychologists say,
arises naturally when a human being senses danger or threat.5 I sense that
beneath the anger I am deeply afraid. Flight is not an option. I write as a
component of my work as a law professor, and I have agreed to read Subotnik's
essay and to write this piece in response. And so it is with some chagrin that I
notice the disposition that has arisen in me as I sit down to read this piece
would be more appropriate for a neighborhood brawl than for communicating
in the manner appropriate for the traditional law review audience that may
read this piece.
I take another deep breath and determine to look within. Why this feeling
of fear? Why does it have such intensity? I've not read the first word of the
essay, after all, so this kind of reactivity is something worth checking out. My
fight-or-flight reactions threaten to get in the way of much good work that my
privileged position as a law professor might otherwise allow me to do. This time,
I want to address it straightforwardly as part of my process of dealing with the
ETHNIC RELATIONS 6-9 (1995) ("Indeed, there is no distinctive biological reality called
'race' that can be determined by objective scientific procedures. The social, medical and
physical sciences have demonstrated this fact."). To maximize the chances of being under-
stood by a readership whose members may remain more committed to less critically ex-
amined notions of race and gender, I use here the terms conventional to our society's most
common construction of my particular body and physical features. I am aware not only of
the constructed nature of these, but also of the higher and the deeper dimensions of what
it means to be a human being, and therefore, of whom I am. See Rhonda V. Magee An-
drews, The Third Reconstruction, 54 ALA. L. REV. 483 (2003) [hereinafter Magee Andrews,
The Third Reconstruction]; see also Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, Racial Suffering as Human Suf-
fering: An Existentially-Grounded Humanity Conscious Approach to a Fourteenth Amendment Re-
born, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 891 (2004) [hereinafter Magee Andrews, Racial
Suffering as Human Suffering]. But see generally KEN WILBER, INTEGRAL PSYCHOLOGY: CON-
SCIOUSNESS, SPIRIT, PSYCHOLOGY AND THERAPY (2000) (describing an integral approach to
psychology that would "endeavor to honor and embrace every legitimate aspect of human
consciousness" and include the best of premodern, modern, and postmodern understand-
ings of human existence).
4. As this article goes to press, USF has one openly gay faculty member who is ten-
ured or tenure-track. This professor joined the faculty in Fall 2008.
5. See DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 60 (1997) (reporting psychologist
Dolf Zillman's finding that "a universal trigger for anger is the sense of being endangered,"
and including symbolic threats to self-esteem or dignity).
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task I've agreed to-responding to Subotnik's essay "Are Law Schools Racist?"
in a way that reframes the way we generally think about these kinds of discus-
sions. And I want to do it in writing as a testimony to my own experience, and
as an example of the kind of work with these difficult issues I believe must be
done if we are ever truly to get anywhere across lines of difference and through
clouds of bias in legal education, law practice, and the world at large.
The deep breaths wear off too quickly. I meditate on the question why. And
once again, into my mind pops the title of Subotnik's book: Toxic Diversity.6
Toxic... Diversity.
Together these two words strike an emotional and psychological blow-a
spirit injury7-that nearly incapacitates me. It is a searingly and unmistaka-
bly assaultive title, calculated to strike at the hearts of the adherents of the
diversity movement that is the wounded legacy of the civil rights movement of
the 1960s,8-itself the legacy of a history of oppression of minority voices in
institutions of power in this country since its founding.9 And the calculated
effort pays off It physically hurts to read or to think the title of the book which
provided the frame and starting point for Subotnik's presentation at USE,
which, in turn, provided a frame for his submission to our law review.
But as I take a look at page one of Professor Subotnik's submitted essay,10
I can readily see that it is not what was presented orally at USE. Bits and pieces
of his presentation several months ago float up into my conscious mind. What
did he say that afternoon, when he had the podium all to himself? I recall that
for all that appeared to have been promised by the attack of diversity and Criti-
cal Race Theory in his above-mentioned book, his actual presentation was sur-
prisingly tepid. Veiled. Vague and substantively sparse. "White men are not
allowed to say what they think on this topic, " I recall him saying, a statement
which rang true to me because I have participated in and led many a stifled
mixed-race dialogue on these issues; and, "we need honest dialogue." Again,
6. DAN SUBOTNIK, Toxic DIVERSITY (2005).
7. Magee Andrews, Racial Suffering as Human Suffering, supra note 3, at 905-08
(describing racial suffering and injury as spirit-injury leading to an "unseen spiritual crisis"
and conceiving of the racial justice movement as a universal human awakening with spiri-
tual aims).
8. See Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, Affirmative Action After Grutter: Reflections on a Tor-
tured Death, Imagining aDignity-AffirmingAfterlife, 63 LA. L. REv. 705, 709-10 (2003) (discuss-
ing the view ofJustice Thurgood Marshall, civil rights pioneers and advocates, and critical
race theorists that "integration and remedying societal discrimination must be among the
legitimate aims of affirmative action").
9. See Magee Andrews, The Third Reconstruction, supra note 3, at 490-92; Magee, The
Master's Tools, supra note 1, at 883-85, 897 (discussing the failures of civil rights law and the
consequent calls for societal redress and reparations).
10. See Dan Subotnik, Are Law Schools Racist?: A "Talk" with Richard Delgado About Race
and Racism, 43 U.S.F L. REv. 227 (2008) [hereinafter Subotnik, Are Law Schools Racist?]
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true. But I sat through the nearly hour-long presentation and came away think-
ing I had not heard a single word of these much promised unspoken truths
about what white men really think. And I certainly did not hear much re-
vealing testimony about what Subotnik-the white man with the microphone
and unfettered opportunity to speak-truly thought, believed, and least of all,
felt.
Suddenly I am aware that my deepest fear is that of being unable to sus-
tain the vulnerability that comes with speaking truthfully about these difficult
and emotionally charged matters. I am afraid of falling into the same trance
that seemed to fall on Subotnik that day, and not saying what needs to be said.
I am also afraid of being hurt by others' responses, of having my own presence
in legal academia publicly called into question and de-legitimized, and of let-
ting the wounds of having to meet such challenges again and again cut a new
hole deep within.
With the writing of this prologue, my anger and my fear subside. I know
from experience that respectfully speaking what is true for me, however awk-
wardly and incompletely, will be its own salve. And I know that I have some-
thing worthy to say. But first, I must listen-that is to say, I must read what
Subotnik has written. I take up the essay titled "Are Law Schools Racist?" and
begin.
I. Introduction
To write and to speak about race and racial justice in the United
States is to position oneself for battle in an ongoing cultural and polit-
ical war. Embedded in the idea of race is a socially constructed debate
over what it means to be a human being; embedded in the idea of
racism is a debate over what it means to be a just democratic commu-
nity. Hence, argumentation and debate over racial justice and rem-
edy, including debates over affirmative action in the legal academy,
ultimately represent the clash of competing visions of the causes and
effects of racially (and gender) disparate outcomes in the world, and
of narratives of the good and just response to those disparities under
the rule of law.
Law is a central vehicle for the articulation of the terms and
methods of debates on these important issues. And yet, as a means of
addressing emotionally charged social issues, law has its limits. Indeed,
a generation ago, critical legal scholars noted the alienative conse-
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quences of all of law and its traditional norms and processes." These
alienating consequences may operate with particular intensity when it
comes to discussing issues of racial and gender injustice and the role
of law.
Two developments within the past generation offer means to ad-
dress these consequences, and provide approaches to law which both
bring people together and permit a closer engagement with ourselves.
First, a subfield has emerged within law which aims to promote aware-
ness of the role of law as a potential source of both healing and
wounding. "Therapeutic jurisprudence" highlights the capacity of law
(law practice, legal scholarship, the application of law, etc.) for both
wounding and healing. It seeks to highlight its potential for the latter
and minimize the potential for the former. 12 The therapeutic justice
model dovetails with restorative justice approaches to law, which see
conflict as a call for healing and restoration of interrelated members
of community. Second, a growing body of work within contemporary
psychology affirms these trends by underscoring the connection be-
tween affective and emotional experience and our intellectual and ac-
ademic outcomes. Gathering under the headings of social and
emotional intelligence and learning,' 3 these new approaches demon-
strate the need for a paradigm shift in the way we approach emotion-
ally charged issues, such as those dealing with race and gender, in the
law and the legal academy.
Against this backdrop, in this Article I argue that the time has
come to rethink the way we approach the analysis and discussion of
legal matters dealing with fundamental cultural and political conflicts.
We must recognize the aspects of differential power, the historical and
political context, and the potential for wounding re-enactment of
those manifestations of power that inhere in traditional analysis and
debate. We must commit to minimizing the wounding potential of
11. See, e.g., Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights Consciousness and the Pact of the
Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1590 (1984); Duncan Kennedy & Peter Gabel, Roll
Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1, 34 (1984).
12. See, e.g., MARJORIE A. SILVER, THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: PRACTICING
LAW AS A HEALING PROFESSION (2007); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE WINICK, LAW IN A THERA-
PEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, at xxvii (1996); see also Susan
Daicoff, Law as a Healing Profession: The "Comprehensive Law Movement, "6 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL.
L.J. 1 (2006).
13. See, e.g., Howard Gardner, Foreword to EDUCATING MINDS AND HEARTS: SOCIAL EMo-
TIONAL LEARN,,ING AND THE PASSAGE INTO ADOLESCENCE, at ix (Jonathan Cohen ed. 1999)
(describing social and emotional learning as the outgrowth of the contemporary call for
educative models that include "social learning, emotional learning, training in conflict res-
olution and intergroup relations").
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legal discourse, to minimizing the alienative potential of our work,
and to maximizing our students' intercultural communicative capaci-
ties as lawyers and leaders as well as our own as scholars and teachers.
Toward these ends, scholars interested in the legal and political im-
pact of difference and hierarchy should incorporate the research-
driven insights of social and emotional intelligence into their work.
More specifically, legal scholars generally, and race and gender schol-
ars in particular should learn and incorporate the skills and insights of
these new psychologies into their writing and speaking about issues of
inclusion and exclusion. I call for the development of approaches to
law which incorporate the insights of these new psychologies toward a
more fully human engagement with these difficult conflicts, one more
conducive of both stronger student performance and greater schol-
arly effectiveness, and one with a greater potential for healing than for
wounding in the process. I offer an Integral Critical approach as one
such orientation and methodology.
Professor Subotnik's response to Professor Delgado's Rodrigo's Ri-
poste provides one example of a piece of scholarship that reflects the
alienating and wounding potential of mainstream and even critical
race approaches to law. In "Are Law Schools Racist?," Subotnik uses
Delgado's essay as an exemplar and criticizes the storytelling method-
ology employed by Delgado' 4 and the substantive merit of critical race
and gender scholarship in particular, and women and minorities in
the legal academy in general.' 5 In an essay that touches upon much
ground, Subotnik argues critical race and gender theorists have,
14. There are few more widely published and respected critical race scholars than
Professor Richard Delgado, who until recently, was the University Distinguished Professor
of Law and Derrick Bell Fellow at the University of Pittsburgh. He is currently a Professor
of Law at the University of Seattle. See Press Release, Seattle University School of Law Welcomes
Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic to Faculty, http://www.law.seattleu.edu/x2676.xml (last
visited Jan. 5, 2009). Professor Delgado has rightly been lauded for his great contributions
to the founding and development of the field of critical race study. See, e.g., Kimberle6
Williams Crenshaw, The First Decade: Critical Reflections, or "A Foot in the Closing Door," 49
UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1350 (2002) (naming Richard Delgado a "central figure" in Critical
Race Theory); Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to
Federal Pleading, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 85, 90-91 (1994) (describing Professor Del-
gado's definition of racism as "the most complete definition"). His numerous books have
garnered eight national awards and a nomination for a Pulitzer prize. University of Pitts-
burgh Law, Richard Delgado Biography, http://wwv.law.pitt.edu/faculty/profiles/del-
gador (last visitedJan. 5, 2009). He has also edited a leading casebook, see RACE AND RACES:
CASES AND MATERIALS FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA (Juan Perea, Richard Delgado, Angela Harris,
Jean Stefancic & Stephanie Wildman eds., 2d ed. 2007), and an anthology in the field. See
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTrING EDGE (Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed.
2000).
15. Subomik, Are Law Schools Racist?, supra note 10, at 228-29, 232-33.
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among a host of other transgressions, "convinced most whites to
play-and stay-dead."'16 Thus one might argue that the revivification
of at least one white man, albeit with only as much flesh and blood as
one might find in the pages of a law review, is what Subotnik leads his
readers to expect by the end of his essay. One expects this new, "live"
version of a white male professor, speaking candidly about race and
gender, will have something to say that advances the dialogue he
wants to advance. Unfortunately, Subotnik's essay fails to deliver.
In this essay, I describe how Subotnik fails to meet these expecta-
tions. I then suggest an approach to preparing and framing such con-
versations, whether in writing or orally, which may heighten our
capacities to reach common ground on the matters of wrong and re-
dress around which we so often divide. Following a situated content
analysis and critique of Professor Subotnik's response to Professor
Delgado (Part II), I suggest we can advance our efforts to discuss mat-
ters dealing with race and gender in the legal academy by personal
and institutional commitments to a deeper kind of discourse, one that
integrates the best in contemporary understanding about the way in
which human beings respond to conflict holistically, and one which
takes as its goal not mere adversarial debate, but restorative justice
and healing. I suggest that effective communication about these diffi-
cult issues requires mutually respectful engagement and compassion-
ate listening-requiring skills that most of us have never intentionally
sought to develop and rely on explicitly in the framing of public dia-
logue. I suggest here that to avoid replicating patterns of domination,
emotional injury, and alienating despair within the discussion itself,
those of us committed to better understanding one another across the
divides of race, gender, and the like must develop and draw on com-
munication and emotional awareness skills to deepen our capacity to
communicate with mutual respect about difficult issues such as those
raised by Subotnik's critique before we may expect to be able to work
together to resolve issues of accountability and redress in ways that
might benefit us all. In Part III, I demonstrate this approach.
II. Taking Subotnik Seriously? A Situated Review of His
Methodological and Substantive Critique
As a Black woman who has lived at widely disparate points along
the spectrum we call "class" in America, and who now teaches courses
on critical legal theories at a United States law school, what white
16. Id. at 246.
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American men have to say about race and gender has always struck me
as something I want and need to hear. So Professor Subotnik's project
hits quite close to home. Indeed, it feels personal. It feels personal
because I have personal experience on the receiving end of bias since
my days as a student bussed to integrate a number of public schools in
Virginia through my life in the academy as a Black woman professor.
It feels personal because my life's work is about doing my part to re-
construct legal education in the post-integration world, to dismantle
the legacies of entrenched differential access and power that are the
legacies of our country's past explicit commitments to white male
dominance. It feels personal because, since my earliest published legal
writings, I have included and relied upon the insights of critical legal
scholars-men and women of color and white men and women as
well-in analyses of the law and its lived implications that have been
strengthened by them.17 It feels personal because I have spent the past
nine years teaching a course in which I regularly invite all students-
men and women of every stripe and color-to study, reflect on, and
discuss the historical intersections of race and law, and to thereby be-
come more comfortable talking about and working with these difficult
issues as lawyers and leaders. Because I know what it is like to be regu-
larly discouraged from speaking the truth to those who would, if they
could, literally and figuratively place a hand across my mouth, I am
inspired by the critical legal scholarly tradition, even when and where
I disagree with some of its adherents' writings, as I often do.
Members of the academy who write about race, including those
who consider themselves Critical Race Theorists, are by no means
monolithic in precise theoretical viewpoint, substantive emphasis, or
methodological approach. By every conceivable measure, we are a vast
and diverse bunch. We include people of every racial background and
both genders, and we see vastly different means of addressing the
problems we see at the intersection of race and law.' 8 Some hold views
more essentialist or fundamentalist than my own race-sensitive and
17. See, e.g., Magee, The Master's Tools, supra note 1.
18. See Crenshaw, supra note 14, at 1343-44; see also Ilhyung Lee, Race Consciousness
and Minority Scholars, 33 CONN. L. REV. 535, 568-69 (2001) (describing the "racial funda-
mentalism" versus race consciousness debate among scholars of color, and raising the un-
derlying question of the debate between integrationism and segregationism that is often
under-acknowledged in scholarship concerning race); see also Magee, The Master's Tools,
supra note 1, at 868-70 (arguing that the debate between integrationism and separatism is
key to understanding nuanced differences of opinion among advocates of racial
remedies).
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spiritual-humanistic Humanity Consciousness 19 view-an ultimately
universalist approach which some might characterize as a progressive
(and perhaps unworkable or even naive) version of the much-
maligned colorblind doctrine. 20 I am therefore greatly troubled by the
ease with which Subotnik seems to dismiss, as singular and unified,
the broad, noisily diverse category of critical race and gender
theorists.
However they might be labeled or categorized, my writings over
the past several years readily reflect that I am committed to bringing a
sense of common ground to the fore in discussing typically divisive
matters. Thus, I reflect in this moment on my awareness that being
discouraged from speaking the truth is by no means an experience
limited to people of color and women. No doubt Professor Subotnik
has at least some personal experience with feeling marginalized and
shut down in his efforts to speak about this issue, which no doubt
animates his ostensibly objective, logically derived views.21 Thus, I am
shocked to find that nowhere in his response to Delgado does
Subotnik throw off the sort of veil behind which he suggests Professor
Delgado hides,22 and step up in a way that might demonstrate a grap-
pling with all the relevant partial facts and emotions that animate his
scholarship the way it consciously animates mine.
Throw aside his own veil Subotnik does not. Instead, he purports
to use the fictionalized storytelling method made famous by Delgado
and others to convey a critique of that method which hints, we are left
to assume, at his own views of what is to be done. 23
As a preliminary matter, and substantive differences aside, one
cannot but explicitly criticize as highly inappropriate the tenor and
overbreadth of many of Subotnik's assertions and claims. Global or
caustic attacks in an article submitted as legal scholarship must be ac-
knowledged for what they are-uncivil, offensive, and demeaning of
the presumption of mutual respect psychologists suggest may be an
19. See infra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing humanity consciousness as a
goal of simultaneously appreciating the particularities of one's radicalized experiences,
and at the same time underscoring our common humanity).
20. See generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Iden-
tity, Group Politics, and Reform, 49 UCLA L. Rrv. 1455 (2002) (describing and critiquing
progressive colorblindness approaches among scholars of race and racism); see also sources
cited supra note 18.
21. See SUBOTNIK, Toxic DIvERsITY, supra note 6, at xiii-xiv.
22. Subomik, Are Law Schools Racist, supra note 10, at 250-51.
23. See, e.g., id.
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essential predicate for mutual empathy.24 Such comments hardly de-
serve a response that would accord them undeserved legitimacy. 25
Leaving aside, for the moment, the problematic tone and style
(we return to this matter in Part III), we might as well ask: what are the
"truths" (opinions) to which Laz/Subotnik gives voice? They are
these:
(1) that the poor performance of Black students relative to others
in law schools, or the underperformance of Blacks in these environ-
ments according to predictors weakens the case for affirmative action,
and that racism plays no significant role in this underperformance; 26
(2) that the author/character has reservations and concerns
about the "unfairness to white students" and the "social tensions that
ignoring these students' needs exacerbates"; 27
(3) that he/the character might (who knows?) be able to accept
affirmative action if Delgado argued that "conditions for black people
have made it impossible for black students as a group to catch up for
the foreseeable future, and that at all cost American society has to do
something about it";28
(4) that white men are insecure29 and should nevertheless be as
encouraged as anyone to devote themselves to the study of race; 30
(5) that because Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., became, well, Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., the fact that he "flunked" the GRE should not
give rise to a critical evaluation of that examination with a view to-
wards determining whether it was biased in a way that unfairly de-
prived King of becoming a professor of sociology, should he have so
chosen;S1
24. See How CONNECTIONS HEAL: STORIES FROM RELATIONAL-CULTURAL THERAPY 10
(Maureen Walker & Wendy B. Rosen eds., 2004) [hereinafter How CONNECTIONS HEAL].
25. Indeed, disagreement and incivility among scholars of color who focus on race
has garnered its own critical commentary and concern. See Lee, supra note 18, at 535
(describing the emotionally charged nature of dialogue regarding race, even among schol-
ars of color); id. at 588 (speaking of the uncivil tone among scholars discussing race in a
recent law review colloquy and expressing his dismay that "[h]owever broad the reaches of
academic freedom, such rhetoric is the sort that the legal academy should not en-
courage"); id. at 590 (querying "whether uncivil dialogue . . . is not only unnecessary but
unscholarly").
26. Subotnik, Are Law Schools Racist?, supra note 10, at 239-46.
27. Id. at 241.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 230.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 243-45.
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(6) and finally, that if we read between the lines we can see what
minority and women scholars who employ the narrative format really
mean-despite their use of these insidious narrative formats-and see
that what they mean is simply to beat up on white people,3 2 and to
privilege, self-promote, and self-aggrandize themselves. 33
Putting words into the mouth of the character Laz, Subotnik ap-
pears to call for a simple solution to at least this last point-that is,
minority and women academics must be held to the same standards as
white males when they "weigh in on race and gender. '34 However, just
how women and minorities in legal academia are not held to the same
standards as white men in legal academia when they weigh in on race
and gender Laz/Subotnik does not clearly say. Subotnik is certainly
aware of the fact that scholarship on race, including critical legal
scholarship focusing on race and gender issues in a way consistent
with my own, is spiritfully engaged in and produced by men and
women of every socially constructed color, including white men-who
raise no such complaints. 35 Subotnik fails to explain what standards
should govern scholarship regarding race and gender that do not al-
ready apply. Instead, here as elsewhere in his essay, Subotnik is con-
tent to do that which he alleges against the scholars whose work he
appears to find disrespectful-he makes assertions without substantia-
tion.36 Indeed, Professor Subotnik seems to be content to engage in
all of the sins he claims against these women and minorities. He
claims that "minority and feminist scholars are saying horrendous
things about white males-and mostly with impunity, '3 7 and then he
goes on to say horrible things about minority and feminist scholars.3 8
32. See id. at 250-51.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 230.
35. Critical legal scholarship was developed primarily by white male scholars, includ-
ing, notably, Duncan Kennedy, Peter Gabel, and Michael Fischl. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, LE-
GAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY (2004); Gabel, supra note 11;
Michael Fischl, The Question that Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 779
(1992); see also, e.g.,JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY (1970); TIM WISE, WHITE
LIKE ME: REFLECTIONS ON RACE FROM A PRIVILEGED SON (2004); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A
Case for Race Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060 (1991); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness,
1990 DUKE L.J. 758 (1990); Noel Ignatiev, How to Be a Race Traitor: Six Ways to Fight Being
White, in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR (Richard Delgado &Jean
Stefancic eds., 1997).
36. Subotnik, Are Law Schools Racist?, supra note 10, at 232-33.
37. Id. at 228.
38. Id. at 229 (blaming eighty-eight faculty members, including forty-six women and a
good number of members of the African and African American Studies Program, for
"sign[ing] a statement denouncing racism and sexism on campus, thus ... upending the
lives of three young white students"); id. at 232 (describing de-contextualized statements by
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Subotnik claims minority and women critics attempt to interpret sto-
ries so as to reflect ill on white men, and yet the bulk of his essay
misrepresents the work of women and minority critics apparently in
an effort to reflect ill on women and minority critics. 39 And so on.
(Sigh.) Sadly, some of these attacks have become rather standard
fare in the legal academy in this era of colorblind constitutionalism,
and the claims of reverse discrimination that have characterized the
backlash against affirmative action. They have been set forth and re-
futed by scholars much more deft and capable than either Subotnik
or myself. In keeping with my stated objective of arguing for a more
intentionally self-reflective frame for discussions of issues such as this,
I do not intend to go claim by claim into responses to the substance of
these multiple and widely varying assertions. Each of these would be
better addressed and discussed via direct, self-aware, and personal
communication, rather than in the format adopted here by Subotnik,
and I return to this claim by way of partial illustration, in Part III. In
the balance of this section, I demonstrate a few of the ways in which
Subotnik's critique of both the substance and the methodology of the
critical analysis represented by Delgado's Rodrigo's Riposte lack merit.
By even the most generous standards, acquitting oneself well as a
race law scholar adequate to the task of critiquing the entire field of
critical race and gender scholarship would require at least a cursory
degree of engagement with the core elements and themes of Critical
Race Theory ("CRT")-even if only to prepare oneself to dismiss
them.40 But rather than engage the relevant theory, Subotnik ignores
the core elements of the theory he not only critiques, but has also
sought to teach. 4 1
To take one of the most obvious and troubling examples,
Subotnik's purported favorite choice of definition for the concept of
racism is drawn from none other than the Oxford dictionary. 4 2 This
definition may be perfectly appropriate for use in general, lay conver-
sation. But as a foundational element in the field he seeks to engage
MacArthur Genius Award winners and Distinguished Professors Patricia Williams, Profes-
sor Derald Wing Sue, and Michael Eric Dyson as "grandiose and silly"); id. at 248 ("The
race theorist will create or accept any argument to take the onus off the students them-
selves, or their parents, and drops it on whites.").
39. Id. at 228-29.
40. See generally KiMBERLEC WILLIAMS CRENSHAW ET AL., CRITICAL RACE THEORY. THE
KEY WRJTINCS THAT FORMED THE MOVME.IT (1995) (discussing the core elements of Criti-
cal Race Theory through the movement's most important historical essays).
41. See SUBOTNIK, TOXIC DIVERsITY, supra note 6.
42. See Subotnik, Are Law Schools Racist, supra note 10, at 235 ("A belief in the superi-
ority of a particular race; prejudice based on this.").
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and explicate, a minimum standard would demand at least a passing
consideration of a more technical definition. The dominant defini-
tions of the term employed by race scholars today elaborate "racism"
as susceptible of both personal/individualized operation and manifes-
tation, as well as impersonal or unconscious racism and systemic or
institutionalized racism. Yet, Subotnik makes only a throwaway refer-
ence to impersonal forms of structured subordination, such as institu-
tionalized racism. 43 Informed by an interdisciplinary appreciation of
the nature of embedded hierarchy, critical race theorists have demon-
strated that the inability to conceive of racism as anything but a per-
sonalized form of bigotry or bias is a signal barrier to effective
understanding of the nature of racism today.44 An observer at this dis-
tance cannot know, and I do not want to be read as having suggested
so, but such treatment of a core term in the field indicates Professor
Subotnik may be contemptuous not only of the academic field of study
to which he claims qualification and desire to contribute-i.e., the
theory and operation of race and racism-but also perhaps, even, of
the students who would most likely seek out this field of study under
his tutelage. 45
Whatever the extent to which this is or is not true, the possibility
of it troubles me. Moreover, I am troubled because I see in Professor
Subotnik's piece a great missed opportunity: in all this effort, and de-
spite being given many chances to do so, Subotnik contributes pain-
fully little to the advancement of dialogue about race, gender (or
class, or sexual orientation on any other vector of marginalization in
the history of legal academia) and the consequences of these for the
legal academy today-or for the operation of other institutions from
which women and/or minorities have typically been excluded and in
which straight white males continue to predominate and dispropor-
tionately influence and rule.
Moreover, Subotnik's attacks on the substantive claims of race
scholars are simply not well-founded. Take, for example, his discus-
43. Id. at 237.
44. See, e.g., STEPHANIE WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UN-
DERMINES AMERICA 11-13 (1996); Linda H. Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1164-65 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987), reprinted in A READER ON RACE, CIVIL
RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAw: A MULTIRACIAL APPROACH 127-30 (Timothy Davis et al. eds.,
2001).
45. By Subotnik's own testimony, a former Dean, after considering his proposal for
teaching a course in race and law, summarized Subomik's message to people of color as
"[g]et over it." SUBOTNIK, TOXIC DivERs-v, supra note 6, at xiii.
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sion of one of the most important concepts in the founding of Critical
Race Theory, the concept of double consciousness. 46 Subotnik cor-
rectly cites W. E. B. Du Bois as the progenitor of the notion of the
double consciousness of Blacks, but he mischaracterizes it, describing
in instrumental terms the crucial existential, situational underpin-
nings from which Du Bois suggested it naturally emerges. For
Subotnik, double consciousness appears as little more than a self-ag-
grandizing way of describing a skill Blacks claim to have developed
because they needed it "to survive in America. ' '47 A reasonably close
reading of the original source of this idea-Du Bois' seminal and lyri-
cal collection of essays, The Souls of Black Folk-yields an understand-
ing that Du Bois meant that such double consciousness arose naturally
out of the experience of being cast as both Negro and American,
while being denied the privileges of first class American citizenship
associated with whiteness, within the early twentieth century, deeply
segregated America in which Du Bois lived and wrote. 4 8 A lengthy
quotation seems most necessary here to justly convey Du Bois' illumi-
nating insight:
[T]he Negro is... born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in
this American world,-a world which yields him no true self-con-
sciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of
the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-conscious-
ness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of
others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on
in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness,-an
American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled striv-
ings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength
alone keeps it from being torn asunder.
The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife,-
this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double
self into a better and truer self. In this merging... [h]e would not
Africanize America, for America has too much to teach the world
and Africa. He would not bleach his Negro soul in a flood of white
Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a message for the
world. He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a
Negro and an American, without being cursed and spit upon by his
fellows, without having the doors of Opportunity closed roughly in
his face. 49
46. The concept figures prominently in the work of Mari Matsuda, who is a widely-
acknowledged founder of the Critical Race Theory movement and scholarly tradition. See
Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 323, 325 (1987).
47. Subonik, Are Law Schools Racist, supra note 10, at 232 n.23 (citing W. E. B. Du
Bois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 19 (Fine Creative Media, Inc. 2003) (1903).
48. See W. E. B. Du Bois, supra note 47.
49. Id. at 9.
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The concept of double consciousness as framed by Du Bois is
thus both a call for appreciation of context, and an example of the
analytical insights that derive from a deep consideration of a subject's
experience while situated in a given sociopolitical position and histori-
cal-cultural context, and of the impacts of these on a subject's
worldview. Nothing in Du Bois' essay on the matter suggests that
Blacks develop double consciousness intentionally, or out of "need."
Although Du Bois employs the classical allusions to racialized blood
that were characteristic of the heuristics of his time, few critical race
theorists today would suggest that Blacks, or people of any color, are
privileged with any particular degree or quality of consciousness by
virtue of their skin color alone. In fact many, if not most who would con-
sider their work to fit within Critical Race Theory, would emphatically
reject such an essentialist view of the meaning of race.50 Thus, al-
though his criticism of alternative methodologies and unsupported
analyses51 leads one to suspect he might do better, Subotnik himself
fails to consider with adequate care classics among at least two genera-
tions of scholarship that might assist him in a fuller understanding of
the underpinnings of the methods and substance of the critical race
and gender project.
In short, one might be forgiven for concluding that Subotnik
"doth protest too much,"52 to borrow a phrase from a white man
whose writings I much admire. From both a methodological and a
substantive standpoint, critical race and gender theorists have long
been committed to setting forth alternative methods of accessing and
reporting what we consider to be reliable knowledge.53 A more sedu-
lous consideration of CRT scholarship would provide a basis for un-
derstanding not only its core terms and founding tenets but also its
grounding in an ethic of interconnection and theory drawn from the
lived experience of each and all which supports the privileging of
storytelling and narrative as epistemological sources of the first
order.54
50. See, e.g., Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, in CRITICAL
RACE FEMINISM: A READER 348-58 (Adrian Wing ed., 2d ed. 2003) (discussing how women
of color have been influenced by a legacy of racism and sexism that is neither linear nor
logical).
51. Subotnik, Are Law Schools Racist?, supra note 10, at 232-33.
52. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Hamlet, in THE RVERSIDE SHAKESPEARE 1189, 1212 (G.
Blakemore Evans ed., 1997).
53. See Harris, supra note 50, at 79 (discussing the "border-crossing" methods of Anna
Julia Cooper).
54. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 46, at 325; see also VvLA N M. MAY, ANNAJUUA COOPER:
VISIoNARY BLACK FEMINIST 118 (2007) ("[A] foundational assumption shaping Cooper's
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Turning to Subotnik's critique of this narrative-based methodol-
ogy, I find it comes up short of expectations here as well. The story-
telling embraced by Delgado, among others (most prominently
Derrick Bell55) demands, on its face, better than the sort of ridiculing
treatment Subotnik serves up in his essay. However, it may well be that
the debate Subotnik seeks to inspire over the value of storytelling as a
method is largely a thing of the past. Storytelling, narrative, and re-
flective writing "across the curriculum has been widely embraced by
law professors and is gaining ground in law schools at an impressive
rate. '56 To the extent Subotnik seeks to portray storytelling as peda-
gogically unhelpful, his effort fails to grasp and contend with an
emerging reality: that mainstream scholars, aware that all law is story-
telling of a sort, appear to be lining up in robust disagreement.
A moment's reflection suggests why this might be so. Prelimina-
rily, I note that there are at least two kinds of narrative found in CRT
scholarship. The type of narrative employed by Delgado and Derrick
Bell, and apparently mocked here by Subotnik, is what I refer to as
"fiction-based" narrative or storytelling. Another type might be called
"true story" or nonfiction narrative. Fiction-based narrative relies on
characters created by the authors to present compelling narrative dis-
cussions of issues in a life-like contextualized setting. For scholars who
rely on it, like Bell and Delgado, fiction-based storytelling captivates
research is that there is no intrinsic hierarchy among humans, no natural rank order of
cultures or nations: those that exist, past and present, are socially created and maintained,
not innate or immutable."); id. at 187 (describing the work of Cooper and other feminist
theorists as "[c]onceptualizing the self as inherently connected to others and therefore
arguing for an ethic of reciprocity and collective accountability").
55. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BoTToM OF THE WELL (1992).
56. See Nancy Levit, Legal Storytelling: The Theory and Practice of Reflective Writing
Across the Curriculum 8 (June 12, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
("Despite some contentious debate in the early 1990s about whether storytelling consti-
tuted credible legal scholarship, storytelling has become firmly entrenched not only in
jurisprudence, but more fundamentally, in the ways we think about teaching and practic-
ing law." (internal citations omitted)); see also Derrick Bell, Visiting Professor, New York
University School of Law, Writing Across the Curriculum, Remarks at the Association of
American Law Schools Annual Meeting (January 4, 2008) (personal notes on file with au-
thor). Despite these hopeful signs, the debate will go on among traditional scholars of
every color and gender and their progressive counterparts, as the bitter difference of opin-
ion between traditionalists and those who embrace alternative forms of scholarship will
likely always find clamorous new participants. Cf Lee, supra note 18, at 579 (quoting Pro-
fessor Jim Chen as provocatively distinguishing among "the storytellers and the serious
scholars," even as Chen later admits his own use of narrative in the same article to bolster
its rhetorical and persuasive appeal).
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and informs in ways that have transformative potential that traditional
legal scholarship does not.5 7
I have never employed fiction-based storytelling in my own pub-
lished work. I have, however, often relied on nonfiction narrative and
reflective writing as one tool among many in my teaching and scholar-
ship toolbox. I often include a bit of such narrative in my own scholar-
ship, in conjunction with more traditional legal analysis. 58 For me,
these more personally revealing and reflective first person "true-story"
narratives are more effective than their fictional counterparts. They
fall in line with my training in qualitative research methods as a soci-
ologist, serving as anecdotal sources of qualitative empirical data of
the sort (albeit lacking the attention to guidelines appropriate to gen-
erally accepted qualitative research) quite often relied upon by social
theorists in the development of quantitative research questions and
grounds the building of theory.59 And they strike me as yielding more
genuinely productive and deeply transformative responses-i.e., truly
revealing disclosures from one's heart have the potential to touch and
transform the heart of another in ways that stories using fictionalized
characters typically do not. Thus, and like many others in the acad-
emy,60 I see storytelling as an inevitable aspect of law, law-making, and
the practice of law, and I therefore see tremendous value in story-
telling within legal writing and pedagogy. 61
Moreover, critical scholars see narrative as legitimate, alternative
approaches to traditional legal scholarship with the potential for fur-
57. See Levit, supra note 56, at 6 (reflecting on Derrick Bell's simple observation that
"People are moved by stories more than by legal theories." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
58. See Magee, The Master's Tools, supra note 1, at 864 (discussing the author's experi-
ence in a history of law class that failed to address slavery); see also Magee Andrews, Racial
Suffering as Human Suffering, supra note 3, at 891, 912 (recounting stories about a delivery
man and a law firm diversity committee).
59. See, e.g., THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS (Norman K.
Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln eds., 3d ed. 2005) (defining and discussing the role of qualita-
tive research methods, including first person interview, or narrative). Social scientists have
coined the term "autoethnographic" to describe these methods.
60. For a classic and still germinative discussion of law as narrative, see Robert M.
Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1982) (describing law as a vehicle through
which narratives of right and wrong are set forth and disseminated). See also id. at 4 ("No
set of legal institution or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and
give it meaning.").
61. Indeed, I encourage students in my race-related seminars to use nonfiction narra-
tive to contextualize their analyses of legal claims. Furthermore, to aid them in practicing
the skill of deploying this technique effectively, I require these students to keep journals
recording their thoughts.
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thering the anti-subordination goals of critical theory and teaching.6 2
For notwithstanding the gains that have been made since the civil
rights movement of the twentieth century, and the consequent lessen-
ing of racism and sexism within American life, racism and sexism con-
tinue to plague us in society generally, and in the legal academy
specifically.63 Thus, engagement in critical discourse within the halls
of academia continues to be an act of courage against institutionalized
power. As feminist theorists have noted, "[p] olitical struggle, cognitive
resistance, and corporeal revaluation affect [one's] arguments and
shape [one's] sentences."64 Such engagement in critical discourse
thus has always demanded and continues to demand alternative meth-
ods of research, reportage, and analysis. Again, recognizing (as have
so many in the academy) that all law is storytelling,65 critical story-
telling is an effective way of reaching people in ways that legal theory
and argument cannot. Critical legal scholars have not only relied on
narrative to further the objectives of the critical theory project, but
they have also led and participated in the broader movement toward
increasing the role of narrative and the skill of narration and reflec-
tion among law students generally for more effective lawyering. 66
Professor Delgado effectively demonstrates these methods in a
fraction of his vast scholarly output over the years, using this method
as one among many ways of advancing the broad project of critical
62. See Charles R. Lawrence, IIl, THE WORD AND THE RIVER: PEDAGOGY AS SCHOLARSHIP
AS STRUGGLE, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT
336, 343-49 (Kimberle6 Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda & Kendall Thomas eds., 1995).
63. I understand that Professor Subotnik doubts the continuing prevalence of racism
(and, one might venture, sexism). A wide body of evidence from the qualitative to the
quantitative confirms that various forms of racism and sexism continue to impact people in
our culture. See Poll Shows Democrats' Racial Views Could Hurt Obama in Close Election, STAN.
STORY BANK (2008), http://storybank.stanford.edu/stoies/poll-shows-democrats-racial-
views-could-hurt-obama-close-election. Such a fundamental difference in understanding is
the sort that critical legal theory and Critical Race Theory would predict to result from our
fundamentally different experiences as socially and racially constructed white man and
black woman. It confirms the value of including within legal scholarship and practice the
perspectives and voices of those whose experiences fundamentally differ, and theory build-
ing aimed at explaining those differences. In other words, Professor Subotnik's dismissive
views on the continuing significance of race and gender exemplify the continuing impor-
tance of the critical race and gender and storytelling project in legal scholarship, teaching,
and practice.
64. May, supra note 54, at 79 (speaking about the effect that political engagement
through scholarship had on the analytical writing of early critical race feminist Anna Julia
Cooper).
65. See, e.g., Levit, supra note 56, at 4-5.
66. See id. at 5. Indeed, even the most ardent race scholars have underscored that
narrative is not the exclusive domain of outsiders. See, e.g. Lee, supra note 18, at 580.
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legal theory and scholarship of dismantling structures which permit
systematized marginalization within law. 67 And this, too, is consistent
with the objectives of critical scholars across a number of disciplines.
Indeed, the work of expanding the acceptable means of dismantling
subtle hierarchies in and through scholarship has long been the work
of scholars aimed at inclusion of traditionally marginalized voices. 68
For example, early critical race and woman's studies scholar Anna Ju-
lia Cooper had to develop "a particular set of political, rhetorical, and
philosophical techniques to negotiate her different audiences' invest-
ment(s) in ... epistemologies of ignorance" and "structured opacities
built into their knowledge practices, such that evasion and self-decep-
tion about privilege, power and inequity become the de facto norms,
even as truth, objectivity, and transparency are the declared epistemic
norms."69 It is, thus, our collective conditioning not to know that critical
scholarship, using a methods such as the narrative format Subotnik
ridicules, aims to dislodge. 70
In short, whatever may be the merits and demerits of storytelling
as an anti-hegemonic device within legal scholarship, and the wisdom
of ongoing debate on this issue, storytelling has served to broaden the
range of acceptable epistemic sources and ontological forms within
legal scholarship, and thus has advanced the cause of critical legal
scholarship in ways we can see and in ways that we cannot.
I note with some dismay that the sort of argument in which I am
presently engaged is what is expected, more or less, in the pages of a
law review. And yes, it can be, and arguably I have sometimes been
downright uncivil here.7 ' I am aware as I write this that argument on
67. Much of Professor Delgado's prolific scholarship in the area of Critical Race The-
ory uses a method other than the storytelling method. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Affirmative
Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want to Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1222 (1991); Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision,
85 Nw. U. L. REv. 343 (1991); Richard Delgado, First Amendment Formalism is Giving Way to
First Amendment Legal Realism, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 169 (1994); Richard Delgado,
Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982).
68. See MAY, supra note 54, at 79-106 (discussing Cooper's efforts to publish relevant
insights on race and gender against a scholarly tradition prone to marginalizing views of
women of color).
69. Id. at 89 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing noted philosopher Charles W.
Mills).
70. Id. at 91.
71. See Lee, supra note 18, at 536 ("[L] egal scholarship, which calls for reasoned analy-
sis of fact and doctrine, has fared no better in the conversation over the difficult subject of
race. There is growing incivility in legal scholarship generally, and when the subject of the
discourse has a racial component, the tone becomes sharp, biting, and sometimes per-
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these points is exactly what apparently has not moved Professor
Subotnik to date. And so, consistent with my own brand of critical
pedagogy and analysis, 72 I turn to an effort to employ a more con-
sciously self-reflective, mutually empathic approach.
IM. On the Pulse of an Integral Approach to Conversations
About Race 73
In the following few paragraphs, I demonstrate an Integral Criti-
cal approach to responding to the challenge to critical scholarship,
sonal. As a result, even (and perhaps especially) in legal academia, much of what is written
about race in legal academia can be dishonest, confused, ill-informed, unhelpful." (inter-
nal citations omitted)).
72. See May, supra note 54, at 85 (discussing Cooper's "more holistic epistemology in
which feelings and thoughts together are recognized as epistemologically significant").
73. Cf Maya Angelou, On the Pulse of Morning, Remarks at the Presidential
Inauguration of William Jefferson Clinton (Jan. 19, 1993), available at http://gos.sbc.edu/
a/angelou.html. It is a call to hope in celebration of diversity that is the great web of life.
A Rock, A River, A Tree
Hosts to species long since departed,
Mark the mastodon.
The dinosaur, who left dry tokens
Of their sojourn here
On our planet floor,
Any broad alarm of their of their hastening doom
Is lost in the gloom of dust and ages.
But today, the Rock cries out to us, clearly, forcefully,
Come, you may stand upon my
Back and face your distant destiny,
But seek no haven in my shadow.
I will give you no hiding place down here.
You, created only a little lower than
The angels, have crouched too long in
The bruising darkness,
Have lain too long
Face down in ignorance.
Your mouths spelling words
Armed for slaughter.
The rock cries out today, you may stand on me,
But do not hide your face.
Across the wall of the world,
A river sings a beautiful song,
Come rest here by my side.
Each of you a bordered country,
Delicate and strangely made proud,
Yet thrusting perpetually under siege.
Your armed struggles for profit
Have left collars of waste upon
My shore, currents of debris upon my breast.
Yet, today I call you to my riverside,
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If you will study war no more.
Come, clad in peace and I will sing the songs
The Creator gave to me when I
And the tree and stone were one.
Before cynicism was a bloody sear across your brow
And when you yet knew you still knew nothing.
The river sings and sings on.
There is a true yearning to respond to
The singing river and the wise rock.
So say the Asian, the Hispanic, the Jew,
The African and Native American, the Sioux,
The Catholic, the Muslim, the French, the Greek,
The Irish, the Rabbi, the Priest, the Sheikh,
The Gay, the Straight, the Preacher,
The privileged, the homeless, the teacher.
They hear. They all hear
The speaking of the tree.
Today, the first and last of every tree
Speaks to humankind. Come to me, here beside the river.
Plant yourself beside me, here beside the river.
Each of you, descendant of some passed on
Traveller, has been paid for.
You, who gave me my first name,
You Pawnee, Apache and Seneca,
You Cherokee Nation, who rested with me,
Then forced on bloody feet,
Left me to the employment of other seekers-
Desperate for gain, starving for gold.
You, the Turk, the Swede, the German, the Scot...
You the Ashanti, the Yoruba, the Kru,
Bought, sold, stolen, arriving on a nightmare
Praying for a dream.
Here, root yourselves beside me.
I am the tree planted by the river,
Which will not be moved.
I, the rock, I the river, I the tree
I am yours-your passages have been paid.
Lift up your faces, you have a piercing need
For this bright morning dawning for you.
History, despite its wrenching pain,
Cannot be unlived, and if faced with courage,
Need not be lived again.
Lift up your eyes upon




Take it into the palms of your hands.
Mold it into the shape of your most
Private need. Sculpt it into
The image of your most public self.
Lift up your hearts.
[Vol. 43
INTRODUCING AN INTEGRAL CRITICAL APPROACH
and to race-conscious remedies such as affirmative action, posed by
the Subotnik critique. I begin by reference to the approach I set forth
several years ago called "Humanity Consciousness. ' 74 Humanity Con-
sciousness calls for a privileging of human dignity through the four
practices of: (1) raising awareness of the interconnectedness of all hu-
mankind; (2) acknowledging the emotional impact of injuries to
human dignity; (3) making ethical judgments in favor of protecting
human dignity; and (4) taking action necessary to make these prac-
tices real in the world. 75 I intend to show here that Humanity Con-
sciousness approach may be deepened by the incorporation of
techniques grounded in the growing field of study referred to as Emo-
tional Intelligence and supported by trainings in Interpersonal Dy-
namics, including techniques which can assist us in reaching common
ground in discussing so-called "divisive" issues, while maintaining a
sense of mutual empathy and respect. Because these new insights
broaden the scope of Humanity Consciousness and critical legal theo-
ries by calling for a more holistic engagement with the embodied self
and other in dialogue and conversation aimed at restorative justice
and healing, I coin the phrase "Integral Critical" to refer to this more
comprehensive approach. 76
Each new hour holds new chances
For new beginnings.
Do not be wedded forever
To fear, yoked eternally
To brutishness.
The horizon leans forward,
Offering you space to place new steps of change.
Here, on the pulse of this fine day
You may have the courage
To look up and out upon me,
The rock, the river, the tree, your country.
No less to Midas than the mendicant.
No less to you now than the mastodon then.
Here on the pulse of this new day
You may have the grace to look up and out
And into your sister's eyes,





74. Magee Andrews, The Third Reconstruction, supra note 3, at 489.
75. Magee Andrews, Racial Suffering as Human Suffering, supra note 3, at 894.
76. But see WILBER, supra note 3, at 2 ("The endeavor to honor and embrace every
legitimate aspect of human consciousness is the goal of an integral psychology.").
Fall 2008]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
First (in accordance with the second prong of the Humanity Con-
sciousness approach noted above), I acknowledge my own feelings af-
ter working through the Subotnik piece thus far. I come away from
the reading of it feeling less angry now than offended, disappointed,
and troubled. There remains anger, an energetic mask for the hurt I
feel at the seemingly bitter and disrespectful nature of much of
Subotnik's piece. I am offended because the tone of much of
Subotnik's mock narrative is indeed simply unkind, unfair, overly re-
active, and inappropriate. I am disappointed because the piece itself
does not reflect Subotnik's obvious potential as a student and scholar
of the race theory he would like to teach, insofar as he lobs criticism
supported by citations which reflect only a cursory read of the works
he has cited and uses rhetorical tactics that seem calculated to shut
down those with whom he disagrees. I am troubled because Subotnik
chooses to see his own troubles through the lens of what amounts to a
standard claim of reverse racism, rather than as indicative of the sub-
stantive appeal of what he (white man or purple) in fact has to say,
and because this kind of attack on the kind of scholarship I am affili-
ated with leaves, me feeling defensive and devalued.
In what is admittedly a bit of a digression, but perhaps one that
serves to alleviate some of my own distress, I find myself wondering
what Subotnik would have done if invited to write a private letter di-
rectly to a minority women professor (let's say, for example, to me),
perhaps even a letter that would convey, in terms chosen to maximize
the likelihood of being fairly heard, what he really thinks. Maybe such
an invitation would have yielded more of the kind of frank disclosure
that he says he wants to make. Instead of the more typically personal
expression that one would expect in such an epistolary exchange
(even one crafted for public dissemination), 77 we have his rather
mocking essay. For someone who wants his own voice to be heard, this
is regrettable, leaving me with some sadness for, and curiosity about,
the plight of Professor Subotnik.
And what of Professor Subotnik's plight? What have been his ex-
periences of and around his own race and gender, taken as a whole?
Has he carefully considered them from the standpoint of the privi-
leges he has enjoyed, as well the disadvantages? I actually want to
77. See, e.g., Adrienne D. Davis & Robert S. Chang, The Adventure(s) in Blackness in
Western Culture: An Epistolary Exchange on Old and New Identity Wars, 39 U.C. DAVIs L. REV.
189 (2006) (examining the politics of positionality in law and literary criticism through an
exchange of letters, and drawing on the insights of critical race and critical gender theory
to formulate some thoughts on the future of critical race feminism).
[Vol. 43
INTRODUCING AN INTEGRAL CRITICAL APPROACH
know. Assuming that his essay gives us a sense of what Subotnik feels
and has experienced by reading between the lines in the way that the
narrative structure he uses and criticizes would suggest that we must,
Subotnik himself has experienced marginalization in the discourse on
race in America, has been angered and hurt by it, and believes that
many white men share his pain. One wonders what else he might say
of his own experience of race, and whether he has experienced the
privileges associated with his race, gender, heterosexual orientation,
and citizenship status, etc., routinely chronicled by whites and others
who have written holistically and self-reflectively of their own racial
experiences with privileges of various sorts. 78
Unfortunately, however, Subotnik does not take this opportunity
to speak plainly of his own personal experience of the disadvantages
or the advantages of his own race and gender identity, and to elabo-
rate what he does unquestionably know-for example, that even as he
grapples with privileged positions relative to others in a society system-
atically structured to grant unearned privilege to whites, to men, to
heterosexuals, to full citizens, and so on, he, along with perhaps many
white men, in fact does feel isolated and marginalized in discussions
about gender bias and racism, is hurt by this isolation, wants to be
heard, and longs to be connected and not feared or derided by
others, and so on. Instead, he ends up denigrating entire fields of
critical scholarship by reference to a few arguably misread pieces, dis-
counting without serious consideration the merit of critical pedagogy
and theory for law students, 79 and leaving anger, division, and demor-
alization in his wake.
Here I resist the impulse I can sense rising within me again
(breathe!)80 to lash out: to accuse Subotnik of all sorts of nefarious mo-
tives in the way that he accuses minority and women scholars, or to
offer up a similarly vituperative measure of disrespect for the ap-
proaches he prefers.8 ' Instead, I choose a different approach. I
choose to presume that, despite our differently diverse identities, de-
78. See, e.g., IVLDMAN supra note 47, at xi-6 (examining how privilege of all forms
manifests itself and how we can, and must, be aware of invisible privilege in our daily lives);
WISE, supra note 35 (examining the ways in which racial privilege shapes the lives of most
white Americans, overtly racist or not, to the detriment of themselves, people of color, and
society).
79. See Subotnik, Are Law Schools Racist, supra note 10, at 232-34.
80. See Rhonda V. Magee, The Mindful Lawyer and the Challenges of Diversity: The
Benefits of Mindfulness in Differently Diverse Practice Settings (2008) (unpublished man-
uscript, on file with author) (discussing the benefits of the meditative perspective in deal-
ing with issues of diversity and difference) [hereinafter Magee, The Mindful Lawyer].
81. Subotnik, Are Law Schools Racist?, supra note 10.
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spite our different locations along axes of power and access, we are at
the same time inevitably interconnected in a single web of human
community and desired well-being. My welfare is bound up with his. I
seek again and to find those aspects of his narrative that promote the
linking of his story with mine.8 2 After all, when considered over the
years and across their own diverse articulations, this isjust what critical
legal studies, including critical race and critical gender theory, in-
spires me to do. This is what Humanity Consciousness suggests is nec-
essary: to begin with the view that most respects the human dignity of
those whose points of view and experiences differ markedly from my
own but without whom I cannot hope ever to experience a truly just
and Beloved Community.8 3 Perhaps we do have different views of the
best approach to the common good, animated by different internal-
ized meta-narratives. Still, Dan Subotnik, being human, wants to be
heard; so, being human, do 1.84 He believes the methods with which
he is most comfortable afford the best methods for getting at the
truth. I favor the methods which are most comfortable for me in get-
ting at my story, too. That said, might we, as two human beings with
similar desires and emotional needs (which cannot be left outside the
door) be able to structure a conversation that would be more likely to
advance our mutual objectives of truth-telling and inclusion? Can we,
82. This is a central object of both relational cultural theory and of the humanity
consciousness approach. In this section, the author applies the techniques and insights of
relational cultural theory, interpersonal dynamics theory, and her own humanity con-
sciousness approach to legal praxis, presenting an integral (or holistic) written response to
Professor Subotnik's essay. Relational cultural theory is an approach to psychology
grounded in the sociopolitical realities of the culture in which it arises. The theory is pre-
mised on the theses that people grow through action in relationship to others, that mutual-
ity and shared power are markers of mature functioning, that mutual empathy is essential
to healing, and that authenticity is essential to the development of such empathy. Interper-
sonal dynamics research posits that the key to developing relationships that permit sus-
tained, authentic, and mutually intimate communication is the will to be responsible for
acknowledging emotional responses within ourselves, and to holding the reactions of
others with nonjudgmental awareness. See How CONNECTIONS HEAL, supra note 24 (describ-
ing the central role of mutual empathy in effective, healing (therapeutic) relationships);
see also Magee Andrews, Racial Suffering as Human Suffering, supra note 3, at 894 (describing
the Humanity Consciousness approach and its foundation in the presumption of universal
interconnectedness among human beings).
83. For more on the concept of "Beloved Community," set forth by Dr. Martin Luther
King,Jr. as the objective of the civil rights movement, see MARTIN LUTHER KING,JR., WHERE
Do WE Go FROM HERE: CHAOS OR COMMUNITY (1967).
84. Cf Magee Andrews, Racial Suffering as Human Suffering, supra note 3, at 906 (citing
philosopher Martin Buber and discussing the importance of genuine dialogue to the expe-
rience of ourselves as fully human); see also Joshua D. Rosenberg, Interpersonal Dynamics:
Helping Lawyers Learn the Skills, and the Importance, of Human Relationships in the Practice of
Law, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1225, 1249-53 (2004).
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in other words, structure an approach to dialogue on these difficult
issues which consciously aims at transcending the pull to division and
attending with compassion to one another's real experiences and in-
cluding their pain?8 5 Can we do so even as we agree to work together
toward some notion of just results?
Critical race and gender theory, coupled with my own deepening
study of practices supportive of compassionate communication, have
left me hopeful that we can do just that. We can structure a conversa-
tion-not a debate, and not a display of parallel rhetorical and analyti-
cal skills-that would enable us to better hear and understand what
each has to say about our experiences of race and gender and the
relevance of such experience on the work we seek to do as members
of the academy. I imagine that such a conversation would need to be
as inwardly focused as possible, would not only permit but would en-
courage the revelation of emotions and undercurrents that lead one
to one's thoughts, and give those emotions, at least, a full and non-
judgmental hearing. It would be characterized by mutual respect.
What would be the essential predicates to such a potentially trans-
formative effort to address these issues with the care and deftness that
they inherently deserve?
As I have often written, we are not well served by a critical dis-
course put forth by anyone, of whatever color or academic sect, that
does not always and everywhere underscore our common humanity,
and seek first and foremost to find the common ground that always
exists between people. 86 Humanity Consciousness-a reorientation of
the critical legal project which aims to support the deployment of law
in the service of progressive justice while undermining the tendency
of the law and adversarial practice to reproduce patterns of alienation
and hierarchy-rejects the typical categories or race and gender as
essential or inherently determinative, and embraces a radical simulta-
neity in the experience of race and gender, and of multiple "races,"
vectors of privilege, and aspects of both genders, in all of us.8 7 It aims
85. Such an approach is the heart of Humanity Consciousness. See Magee Andrews,
The Third Reconstruction, supra note 3, at 489 (describing the dual race and universal human
dignity stance as the core humanity consciousness gaze).
86. Magee Andrews, The Third Reconstruction, supra note 3, at 538.
87. Id. at 544-45. But see DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION
OF HIERARCHY 7 (2004) ("An essential preliminary is to work against the sense that each of
[a variety of identities commonly found within contemporary legal education and law prac-
tice] is uniquely victimized, uniquely isolated, unintelligible to all the others. In other
words, I'm for some postmodernism-inspired rebellion against identity politics, not in the
name of assimilation to the mainstream but in the name of a large countercultural pro-
ject-cosmopolitan and original rather than inward-turning or backward-looking.").
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at creating spaces large enough to embrace cynicism and despair with-
out losing hope in the possibility of humankind to reconstruct the
world.88 Thus, from the Humanity Consciousness perspective, one can
acknowledge that each of us may be privileged in certain ways while at
the same time being disadvantaged or oppressed in others.89 One can
begin to see clearly that "refusing to acknowledge areas of overlap and
complexity undermines efforts at social change because the opera-
tional 'either/or' theories of oppression and privilege, or of atomized
identities, are not only too narrow but also false."90
Grappling with complex and shifting realities of race and gender
in our lives as we seek an end to patterns of bias, as well as with ac-
countability for wrongdoing and redemption for wrongdoers, requires
that we become expert in seeing and expanding common ground. Yet
experience proves it can be difficult to hear another person well
enough to find the always present common ground without making
several commitments regarding the way we enter into dialogue with
one another. Based on my experience teaching hundreds of students
in seminar-sized classes dealing with these issues, certain basic ground
rules appear especially to help, and two keys seem to be critical: (1) we
must develop within ourselves the capacity to establish and re-establish
trust; and (2) we must make a personal commitment to a thoroughgo-
ing self-awareness along the way. In addition, certain deep communi-
cation skills are necessary, including: the capacity to listen without
interruption, and with as little judgment as possible, that another
might be fully heard to respond without unwarranted interpretation
of the other, blaming or analysis, but rather from the unarguable
truth of one's own feelings, to stay present with what is arising within.
These are not easy capacities to develop, but research in the emerging
fields of Emotional Intelligence and Interpersonal Dynamics tells us
that they can be learned.9a If we want to produce lawyers and law
88. Angela Harris & Donna Maeda, Power and Resistance in Contemporary Legal Educa-
tion, in KENNEDY, supra note 87, at 173.
89. See Magee, The Mindful Lawyer, supra note 80 (discussing invisible privileges of
citizenship available to Blacks today that were not available to Blacks during slavery and in
the generation following the civil war); cf May, supra note 54, at 93 ("(AnnaJulia] Cooper
shows how one can be both subjugated and unjustifiably privileged at the same time.... For
instance, although white women suffer from sexism, they also tend to benefit unduly from
their race[,] . . .lead[ing] to limited concepts of who 'women' are and what 'women's
issues' should be.").
90. May, supra note 54, at 93; see also Magee Andrews, Racial Suffering as Human Suffer-
ing, supra note 3, at 915-19 (lamenting the false-self identity that is racial identity as the
"core alienation," and calling for the experience Martin Buber labeled the "genuine We").
91. GOLEMAN, supra note 5, at 261-87, app. F.
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professors capable of dealing more competently with these issues, we
need legal institutions dedicated to supporting efforts to do so and
assisting in the development and application of the necessary skills.
The larger goal of transcending the divisions that we find our-
selves tempted to recreate in dialogues like these requires that we
think consciously and often about ways of speaking and listening that
generate and seek to access available common ground, rather than
presume its lack. We are not well served by dialogue that does not
evidence a commitment to seeing the common humanity in each of
us; we are also not well served by dialogue that does not always and
everywhere recognize the importance, even where we do not have the
mutual trust necessary to sustain it, of self-revealing, direct communi-
cation about the emotional and sensory experience that accompanies
our efforts to talk about these difficult topics. When we develop this
perspective, and use these skills, we cannot but speak from and to one
another's hearts. It is the premise of this essay that no significant
change happens around issues such as these where we are not able to
meet one another at the level of the heart rather than (or, if you will,
in addition to) at the level of the head. It is the thesis of this essay that
we can draw on communication and emotional awareness skills not
only to deepen our capacity to talk through difficult issues such as
those at the intersection of race and gender in legal academia in the
post-civil rights era, but also to deepen our capacity to write about
these issues more genuinely and effectively, and that we must do so
with mutual respect as we fight for just results.
Had Subotnik chosen an approach to responding to Delgado that
spoke plainly and genuinely to the issues raised by Delgado's essay,
acknowledging the feelings arising for him along the way, and dedicat-
ing himself to commentary founded upon the assumptions of inter-
connectedness and mutual respect, it would likely have encouraged
moves toward more genuinely enlightening dialogue all around. Such
disclosures might have been difficult to bear, as they have often been
in my own life. But I believe they would provide a more promising
starting point for the more challenging dialogue over the require-
ments of justice in a world in which race and gender too often con-
tinue to structure advantage and disadvantage. In the end, we might
still be at odds in our thinking about how best to address the legacies
of racism in legal academia. Such agreement is not uncommon where
legitimate divergence of opinion reflects legitimate options in re-
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sponse to the available perceptions of reality.92 Yet an Integral Critical
approach promises to ground conversations about social justice in
human to human authenticity, from which new capacities for under-
standing, and for action, might reasonably be expected to emerge. 93
IV. Conclusion
"Storytelling"-the use of both fiction-based and nonfiction nar-
rative-is both an anti-hegemonic device and a time-honored and val-
uable communication skill available to all students of law. Yet in this
essay I call for a commitment to engaging one another around diffi-
cult issues dealing with race and gender through direct communica-
tion that is sensitive to both the feeling and the sensory experience
accompanying the conversation. I call for engagement with one an-
other in that way whether we are communicating verbally or in writ-
ing, and I call for an inclusion of such sensitivity in ways that apply
equally to all participants in dialogues about difficult issues-none of
us is "off the hook"; each of us is responsible for doing what we can to
address these issues with greater human capacity and care. It is an
Integral Critical approach: an approach grounded in critical legal
studies which integrates the highest and best thinking about all of the
capacities and sensibilities of the human being, and calls upon us to
draw on our highest and best as whole human beings as we struggle
together through, and find just resolutions for, the most difficult is-
sues of our time.
The skill set that such an approach demands-the capacity to
ground oneself in personal awareness, active listening, facility with the
emotional responses of oneself and those of others-are not regularly
taught to students of law.94 Yet, studies indicate that students who are
taught the skills of emotional intelligence may perform better than
those who are not, and indicate that success in life may well turn on
their effective display. Regardless of their instrumental appeal, with-
out such skills, conversations about the difficult legacies of racism in
the law, whether in person, or buried within the pages of the law re-
views, are bound to continue to promise much and deliver little. Hon-
92. Cf E.F. SCHUMACHER, A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 121-28 (1977) (arguing that all
human problems come down to determining whether the solution leads to convergence-
recognizing that there is one best way to approach it-or divergence-recognizing that
there are many, and counseling transcendence as to divergent realities).
93. See How CONNECTIONS HEAL, supra note 24, at 11-12.
94. ProfessorJoshua D. Rosenberg has pioneered the offering of such a course to law
students at the University of San Francisco, titled "Interpersonal Dynamics for Lawyers." See
Rosenberg, supra note 84, at 1226.
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est and undefended dialogue about racism, sexism, and other deeply
seated structures of bias and preconditioning demand that we set the
stage for such discussions by embracing an approach grounded upon
the cutting-edge insights of the burgeoning fields of social science
which take the whole of our human capacities and experiences be-
yond previous levels of common understanding. Such an approach
takes work. It requires that we build the capacity to communicate re-
spectfully from the unarguable truth-and the unarguable truth al-
most always begins with our emotional responses to what we hear, or
those which are driving us when find ourselves with something we ur-
gently must say.
We all know from experience that communication around the
issues raised by the Delgado/Subotnik exchange is risky, emotionally
challenging, and even politically threatening,95 whether in mixed, ho-
mogeneous, among strangers or in intimate company. One cannot
enter into genuine dialogue about these issues without the courage to
be vulnerable. In the absence of the commitment to communicate in
an integrally conscious way-i.e., not only with argument, and per-
haps without argument at all; but instead with reflective self-awareness
and self-revelation in a commitment to respect and dignity-dialogues
about these issues may continue largely to serve as shields and hiding
places, whether conveyed through the devices of fictionalized charac-
ters, or the more familiar personae, form and rhetoric of traditional
legal analysis. Those of us bold enough and caring enough to desire
to engage in dialogue about such issues owe one another, owe our-
selves, owe the work to which we have committed the energies of our
short lives, much, much better than that.
Epilogue
I have read Professor Subotnik's paper. It was an attack on an esteemed
leader in the field of critical race scholarship in particular, and on critical race
and gender scholarship generally-and hence, on me. It indeed did feel like
one. And yet, with attention to the entirety of my experience, and with confi-
dence that an approach which integrated my feelings and my thoughts together
would best honor my own experience of this project, I completed my very rough
first draft of this response to it this afternoon. It will take many hours of work to
polish and strengthen it-to bolster it with additional citations, to smooth out
the prose-but at least I have overcome the anxiety Iftlt before I began, and
95. See also Lee, supra note 18, at 535, 584 (noting the emotional and other difficulties
attendant to such dialogue).
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embarked upon the compassionate and healing work of allowing my whole self
to speak its response.
Tapping out a response to this essay in a way that permitted me to bring
the whole of my experience in, rather than be constrained by conventional takes
on the tone, structure, and subject matter of legal scholarship, is an exercise for
me in dealing holistically with the truly painful aspects of this project and work
like it. I have practiced saying what I most needed to say in order to more fully
respond, without permitting this project itself to leave yet another wound in my
spirit and soul. This has been an exercise in responding to an abrasive essay
with compassion towards myself, and, I hope, towards Professor Subotnik. This
has been an exercise in healing the heart of justice.96
My response may not be a perfect example of what I wish to call holistic or
integral critical legal scholarship, but it's an effort consciously made in that
direction, and there is some satisfaction in that. Indeed, I relish the search for a
means of addressing the most difficult issues of our time with the care, sensitiv-
ity, and highest capacity for communicating about emotionally difficult matters
that is their due. In so doing, I have reconnected with a deep sense of my own
worth, of the value of the Humanity Consciousness perspective born of my early
struggles, and articulated an Integral Critical approach that blends that per-
spective with insights emerging from cutting-edge social science. I am a more
grounded human being in this moment than I was this morning when I began.
And I am once again clear about why I do the work I have chosen to do.
Communicating it in a way that does not simply invite conventional argu-
ment, but which aims at connecting one human being to another, is the goal of
the scholarship and teaching I intend to extend into the world from this day
forward.
I will turn off my computer now, and head home. Preparation for to-
morrow morning's class from the comfort of my reading room couch will be my
second shift. And yes, Professor Dan Subotnik, along the way of my short drive
across town, a good bread must be picked up for dinner. The dawn of a new
morning awaits.
96. Cf Victor Lewis, Healing the Heart of Justice, Creation Spirituality, in BELL HOOKS,
BLACK LOOKS: RACE AND REPRESENTATION 20 (1992) ("To value ourselves rightly, infinitely,
released from shame and self-rejection, implies knowing that we are claimed by the totality
of life. To share in a loving community and vision that magnifies our strength and banishes
fear and despair, here, we find the solid ground from which justice can flow like a mighty
stream. Here, we find the fire that burns away the confusion that oppression heaped upon
us during our childhood weakness. Here, we can see what needs to be done and find the
strength to do it. To value ourselves rightly. To love one another. This is to heal the heart
of justice.").
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